This is a case about the Exclusionary Rule.  Writing for the 5-4 majority, Chief Justice Roberts argues that the mistakes of law enforcement are not serious enough in the case to justify excluding the evidence. This is not an outrageous argument, and it is not wildly out of line with the relevant cases.

I don’t think this is a wise decision. Why should law enforcement be rewarded for being careless?

Don’t take my word for it.  Read the decision and the dissents for yourself and think about the issues presented.

There are two dissents in this case. The dissent by Chief Justice Roberts argues that the practical consequences of the majority’s decision won’t really help any of the prisoners. Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act in 2005. The Chief Justice argues that the majority decision will end up with a similar scheme, set up by unelected judges instead of elected Congressional representatives.

The dissent by Justice Scalia is overtly totalitarian. Read it for yourself. This is the work product of a frightened, paranoid bigot.

Here is a PDF file of the majority decision and both dissenting opinions.

Here is a link to the 2nd Circuit Opinion. While you’re at it, check out the FCC’s Petition for Cert.

For further study, have a look at the Arizona Supreme Court Decision in this case. Read the decision in Thornton v. US, which is the most recent (2004) Supreme Court decision on the auto search incident to a lawful arrest issue. Other interesting articles on the case can be found here, here and here.

Read the Supreme Court Decision for yourself. The New York Times presented this story and this analysis.

Crawford v. Metro is an important 6th Circuit case that the US Supreme Court has agreed to hear.

At issue is a Federal anti-discrimination law called Title VII. This law expressly protects employees from retaliation in two ways. Employees who participate in an investigation, and those who oppose discriminatory practices are supposed to be shielded from retaliation. But it’s a little more complicated, because those who “participate” actually get more protection than those who “oppose.”

In the instant case, Ms Crawford was a 30-year employee of the defendant, a government agency. She was called in for an interview about allegations of sexual harassment that had been made against a manager. At that interview, Ms Crawford accused the manager of sexual harassment, both of herself and of others. She was later fired.

The Sixth Circuit held that Ms Crawford did not “oppose” discriminatory practices because she did not instigate the investigation by complaining. The court held that Ms Crawford’s participation in the investigation wasn’t protected by the “participation” clause because charges had not yet been filed. This seems to be an unjust result, one that runs against the policies of Title VII.

On appeal, the defendant, now a convicted murderer, argued that the judge violated his right to confront adverse witnesses when the statements were allowed into evidence. Since the victim was dead, he was unable to cross-examine her. The statements were testimonial. They were made out of court and were being offered into evidence. The statements were hearsay.

The California Supreme Court upheld the conviction, holding that the statements were properly admitted under California law, and that it met federal Constitutional standards as well.

What makes this case interesting is the 2004 Supreme Court case of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36. In Crawford, the Supreme Court breathed new life into the Confrontation Clause. Crawford overrules a 1980 case, Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, that had clearly addressed these issues.

The facts in the case were not in dispute. A cable TV company persuaded Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola, two commercial sellers of cable-TV boxes, to jack up their prices and then use the extra profit to buy advertising on the cable system. The cable-TV then recorded the inflated price as a capital expense, and booked the advertising purchases as revenue. This allowed them to pretend to meet Wall Street’s revenue expectations. When the Cable-TV company’s true financial picture became known, its stock collapsed. Plaintiff, a shareholder, Stoneridge Investment Partners, filed the lawsuit.

The 5-to-3 decision held that the plaintiffs must be able to show that they relied on the deceptive behind-the-scenes behavior of the defendants in making their decision to acquire or hold stock, in order to have a cause of action. The majority held that, since the bad behavior wasn’t communicated to the marketplace, it can’t be said to have induced reliance.

Care to look into the case for yourself? Here are links to the instant case, and to a couple of key related cases:

Stoneridge v. Scientific-Atlantic

Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U. S. 224 (1988)

Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., 511 U. S. 164 (1994)